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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Respondent, :

-v-

••

ROBERT REEDY, JR.,

Case No. 18082

••

Defendant-Appellant

••

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Robert Reedy, Jr., appeals from a
conviction folowing a jury trial of the crime of Aggravated
Robbery, a felony of the First Degree •
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with and convicted of
Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the First Degree, in violation
of Title 76, Chapter 6,

§

302 ·of Utah Code Ann.

(1978).

Subsequently, the trial judge entered a judgment of conviction
for the next lower category of offense, pursuant to the motion
•

of appellant's counsel, and sentenced the appellant to serve
an undeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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State Prison as provided by law for a felony of the Second
Degree.I
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the conviction and
sentence rendered below affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 28, 1980, Mr. John Palmer, an attendant at a
service station located at 200 West, 1300 South, Salt Lake
City, was robbed by two men.

The robbery occurred during

daylight hours, between 8:15 to 8:30 a.m. of that morning
(T. 10).

The two perpetrators first approached Mr. Palmer and

asked for change so that they might use a Coke machine on the
premises (T. 10).

After using the machine, one of the

perpetrators approached Palmer again and displayed a revolver
(T. 10).

This perpetrator, whom Palmer later described as

having dark hair and a small moustache, demanded that Palmer
give him all the station's money (T. 11).

Palmer indicated he

I

was face-to-face with this man, whom he later identified on a
police photograph, for a period of "probably five to six
minutes" (T. 15).

Palmer picked this photograph out of six

different photos shown to him twelve days after the crime
(T. 15,16).

l

When asked whether he was certain that the man

Respondent has confirmed that the Third District Court
file contains a Judgment and Commitment which reflects the
proper sentence.
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in the photograph was the perpetrator, Palmer replied that he
was "one-hundred per cent sure" (T. 17).
Palmer was able to give a detailed description of
the weapon used in the holdup, indicating that it was black,
about eight inches long, and probably a .22 caliber pistol (T.
11,12).

Also, while the robbery was going on, Palmer was able

to remember that the second individual, who appeared with the
gunman originally to get change, was over on the other side of
the gas station looking through a glass sliding door (T. 13).
Finally, Palmer clearly recalled that both men ran
to the other side of the gas station, jumped a fence, and ran
through a parking lot as they fled the crime scene (T. 14).
After this escape, Palmer had presence of mind to immediately
call the police despite a threat made by the gunman to prevent
Palmer from doing so (T.14).
The sole issue at trial, which occurred over one
year after the robbery, was identification.

Despite his

identification of the perpetrator from the police photograph,
Palmer was unable to make an in-court identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator of this crime.
A Salt Lake City

po~ice

officer, John Cook,

testified that the photograph Palmer identified prior to the
trial was a picture of the appellant, Robert Reedy (T. 38).
The officer also testified that approximately one year before
the trial Reedy had looked very similar to the photograph that
had been taken (T. 39).

Cook described a number of changes
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that had occurred in the appellant's appearance between his
arrest a:~d trial.

These changes in appearance included a

weight loss and a difference in hair style (T. 40). One of the
reasons Palmer could not identify the appellant in court as
the man who robbed him was because of a hair style difference
(T. 17).

The appellant requested at trial that the jury be
given what has become known as a "Telfaire"2 instruction on
the danger of inaccurate identification of perpetrators by
eyewitnesses.

The trial judge refused to give this

instruction, but instead gave one instruction which cautioned
the jury that the appellant was entitled to a presumption of
innocence and not to convict
to his guilt

(J~I.

~f

#4, R. 33).

they held reasonable doubt as
Also, another instruction

which told jury members that ·they were the exclusive judges of
witness credibility and .the weight to give evidence was given.
This instruction cautioned jury members to consider the
capacity of a witness to remember in assessing his testimony
(J.I. #6, R. 35).

.

+·

Also, during trial, the appellant's counsel

rigorously cross-examined Mr. Palmer, the key eyewitness, and
pressed the issue of a possibly inaccurate identification
during his final argument to the jury (T. 18-32, T. 63-75).
Nevertheless, the appellant was convicted by the jury of
•
aggravated
robbery.

2

See U.S. v. Telfaire, D.C. Circuit, 469 F.2d 552 (1972).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION
CONCERNING THE DANGERS AND INACCURACIES
OF EYEWITNESS WAS PROPER.
A.

THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT REQUIRED
UNDER THE LAW.3
In the case of State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d

56 (1982), this Court held that it was not error for a trial
court to fail to give a similar instruction on the potential
inaccuracy of eyewitness identification testimony.

3

In

Proposed Jury Instruction
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or
impression by the witness.
In this case its value depends
on the opportunity the witness had to observe whether or
not the defendant was the person who committed the
aggravated robbery of John Glen Palmer on June 28, 1980,
and to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a
witness, you should consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the
capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the
off ender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to
observe the person at the time will be affected by such
matters as how long or short a time was available, how far
or close the witness was from the offender, how good were
lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion
to see or know the person in the past.
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by
that witness subsequent to the event was a product of his
or her own recollection? You may take into account both
• the strength of the identification, and the circumstances
under which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant
was presented to him.for identification, you should
scrutinize the identification with great care. You may
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Malmrose, the defendant was convicted of forcible sexual
abuse. The victim was attacked while she was jogging at Weber
State College.

Unlike the instant case, where an

identification occurred within twelve days of the offense, the
victim in Malmrose was unable to make any identification of
the defendant until approximately three months had passed
since the crime.

Finally, she picked the defendant out of a

photograph from a school yearbook.
Malmrose appealed his conviction on the basis that
the trial court had improperly failed to give an instruction
on the weight and credibility the jury should give to
eyewitness testimony.
and held otherwise.

This Court considered the proposition
In the majority opinion, Justice Howe

stated:

also consider the length of time that lapsed between the
occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the
witness to see defendant, as a factor bearing on the
realiability of the identification.
(3) Finally, you must consider the credibility of
each identification witness in the same way as any other
witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider
whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a
reliable observation on the matter covered in his testimony.
The burden of proof on the State extends to every
element of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator
is such an element. The State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Robert Reedy, Jr., was the
perpetrator of the offense in question in this case. If
• after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt
as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the
defendant not guilty (R. 66-67).
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We have not heretofore held that such
an instruction is required. We believe
the giving of it should be left to the
discretion of the trial court.
Such a position is sound; the trial judge is most
able to assess the appropriateness of an instruction on a case
by case basis.

Justice Stewart's dissent in Malmrose

indicated that such an instruction should have been given to
the jury because (1) there were discrepancies in the victim's
description of the defendant and his actual appearance; (2)
there was a lengthy period of time between the assault and
identification; (3) the photographic identification may have
been suggestive because at first only two pictures were shown
the victim; and (4) there was substantial corraboration of the
defendant's alibi.

A close analysis of the case at bar

reveals that none of these factors is present.

First, there

was little or no discrepancy between the description of the
defendant and his actual appearance when arrested.
long, dark hair and was heavy-set.
from

a

He had

Second, his identification

photograph occurred only twelve days after the crime.

Third, six photographs instead of two were shown to the
identifying eyewitness, Mr. Palmer.

Appellant does not claim

that this procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.

Finally,

appellant offered only a weak defense in the form of testimony
concerning an alleged beard.
•

In Malmrose, substantial

cooraboration of an alibi occurred from a number of witnesses.
A similar result has occurred in other cases.
v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353 (1980).
-7-

State

State v. Schaffer,
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Utah, 638 P.2d 1185 (1981).

In State v. Mccumber, a man was

convicted of sexual assault, burglary, and rape.

Eyewitness

identification was crucial because the victim had been
attacked in the dark in her own bedroom.

Defense counsel

submitted a proposed jury instruction to the trial judge which
was much like the instruction in this case, in that it dealt
at length with the potential inaccuracy and credibility
problems associated with eyewitness identification.

The trial

court refused the instruction and an appeal was made on this
point to this Court.

This Court then held, the trial court

committed no error by failing to give the instruction:
The principle points of defendant's
proposed instruction dealt with the
state's burden of proof and the factors to
consider in weighing the testimony of an
eyewitness. All of these factors to
consider in weighing the testimo-y of an
eyewitness. All of these factors were
adequately dealt with in other instructions presented to the jury by the trial
court. As a result, we cannot agree that
the denial of the proposed instruction
constituted reversible error.
622 P.2d at 359.
In State v. Schaffer, two men robbed a Salt Lake
piz~a

parlor at approximately 10:30 p.m. on a summer night.

The defendant in that case was convicted almost entirely on
the basis of the testimony of two eyewitnesses.

The

circumstances of this identification in Schaffer were less
•
ideal than in our case because the perpetrator in Schaffer was
inside a pizza parlor at night as opposed to being outside a
gas station in daylight at approximately 8:30 in the morning.
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Nevertheless, this Court affirmed the conviction in Schaffer
and held that error had not been committed. This Court said:
Defendant cites authorities stating
that the giving of a specific jury
instruction is desirable when identif ication is in issue.
In view of the general
instructions summarized above and in view
of the witnesses' abundant opportunity to
observe the robber when he was drinking
beer, and when he was in the well lit
kitchen area to order pizza, to empty the
cash register, and to shut the witnesses
in the cooler, the omission of the
desirable identification instruction did
not constitute reversible error.
638 P.2d at 1187.
Finally, the identification in the instant case was
credible because the key eyewitness selected the appellant
from six separate photographs of different individuals and
because the witness observed appellant once when he gave
appellant change, and later when he was robbed.

Moreover, Mr.

Palmer's recollection of a face-to-face daylight encounter
evidences sharp perception and presence of mind retained
throughout a harrowing experience.

Respondent submits that

any normal person would have exhibited some signs of severe
tension and anxiety at the conclusion of Mr. Palmer's
experience; as evidenced by his testimony, Mr. Palmer,
commendably, was in control when it counted -- during the
robbery.

Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord with

these precedents.

In State v. Taylor, Arizona, 109, 267, 508

•

p.2d 731 (1973), the trial court refused to give a similar
instruction on eyewitness identification to a Jury in

-9-
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a murder trial.

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a murder

conviction in this case.

The Court stated that:

The requested instruction on identification would not have added anything to
these general instructions given to the
jury. The trial court's references to the
presumption of innocence, the necessity of
proving all material allegations and the
credit to be given the eyewitnesses would
certainly have meaning for the jury as
applied to the testimony of the identity
witnesses. The weight to be given such
testimony of such witnesses is a matter
for the determination of the jury or court
trying the case.
We find no error in the failure of
the trial court to give the requested
instructions on identity.
508 P.2d at 738.

In State v. Ollison, Oregon, 519 P.2d 393 (1974), a
robbery conviction was sustained by the Oregon Supreme Court.
The conviction was largely obtained on the basis of eyewitness
identification.

Despite the refusal of the trial court to

give a "Telfaire type" instruction to the jury on the problems
of eyewitness identification, the conviction was affirmed. The
Court stated:

•

While an instruction concerning
identification would not have been
unappropriate in this case, our review of
the record indicates that the identity
issue was significantly brought into focus
and drawn to the attention of the jury -both by questions directed to the witnesses and by the court's instructions •
Therefore, the failure to give an instruction on identification was not prejudical
error.

519 P.2d at 396.
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Many other cases have been decided with similar
facts and have also held that no error resulted from a failure
to instruct the jury at great detail as to the potential
inaccuracy and credibility problems of eyewitness
testirnony.4
B.

THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION FAILED
TO FIT THE FACTS OF THE CASE.

A review of the appellant's proposed jury
.

instruction indicates that a number of its passages and
sections are inappropriate here because they do not support
the evidence adduced at trial.

A defendant is not entitled to

a jury instruction if it does not fit any reasonable version
of the facts in the case.

State v. Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261

(1980); State v. Castillo, Utah, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618
(1969). It should be kept in mind that the only issue in this
case was whether the identification of the appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the crime was accurate or not.
Subsection two of appellant's proposed instruction
was inappropriate because it asks the jury to scrutinize

4

State v. Davis, 649 S.W.2d 12 (1982) [Tennessee]. State
v. Gravely, 299 S.E.2d 375 (1982) [West Virginia]. State
v. Arnmburg, 31 Wash. App. 696, 644 P.2d 717 (1982)
· [Washington]. People v. Martinez, Colo. app. 652 P.2d 174
(1981) [Colorado]. Sparks v. State, 604 P.2d 802 (1980)
(Nevada]. Hawaii v. Padilla, 552 P.2d 357 (1976) [Hawaii].
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whether the identification made by the witness was a product
of his or her own recollection.

This was not a problem

because the witness, Mr. Palmer, chose the appellant's
photograph out of a total of six different photographs.

It

was not argued that such an identification was unduly
suggestive or not a product of the appellant's own
recollection.

Also, subsection two speaks of an

identification of the defendant after he has been "presented
to the eyewitness for identification."

This is completely

inappropriate because the identification of the defendant that
occurred here was a photo-identification and not a line-up or
show-up identification as this instruction suggests.

The

concluding paragraph speaks to burden of proof and reasonable
doubt -- areas covered by other instructions given to the
jury.

In sum, the instruction was not properly drafted to fit

the facts of the case.

C.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE
ACTUALLY GIVEN, TAKEN AS A WHOLE,
ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE JURY.

Jury instructions are to be considered as a whole
and are to be reconciled whenever possible.
Schaffer, supra.

State v.

State v. Coffey, Utah, 564 P.2d 777 (1977).

Taylor v. Johnson, Utah, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P.2d 575 (1966).

k number of jury insturctions actually given to the jury in
the instant case did deal with the issues of witness
identification.

-12-
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For example, Instruction No. 4 instructed the jury
members that in order to convict they must find that the State
had proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
(J.I. #4, R. 33).

More significantly, instruction No. 6 told

the jury that:
You are the exclusive judges of the
credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of their testimony.
In so judging
you can take into consideration any
interest a witness may have in a lawsuit
and any bias or probable motive, or lack
thereof, to testify as they do, if any is
shown. You may also consider the deportment of witnesses upon the witness stand
the reasonableness or lack thereof of
their statements, their frankness or the
want of it, their ability to understand,
their capacity to remember and whether any
witness contradicted himself or herself,
and then determine therefrom, in accordance with your honest convictions what
weight and credibility you should give to
the testimony of each witness, measured by
reason and common sense and the rules set
forth in these instructions."
(J.I. #6, R. 35)

(emphasis added).

In view of the rule that jury instructions are to be
considered together, the "presumption of innocence" language
and the "reasonable doubt" language from the fourth
instruction should be considered together with the "capacity
to remember" and "weight of
instruction.

t~stimony"

language of the sixth

When this occurs, it becomes clear that the jury

was properly instructed concerning any potential problems with
eyewitness testimony accuracy.
Additionally, these issues were also raised by
appellant's counsel, both through his rigorous
-13-
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cross-examination of the key eyewitness at the trial, and
t~rough

his final argument to the jury which stressed the

issue of mistaken eyewitness identification at great length
(T. 18-32; T. 63-75).
D. APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION,
MODELED AFTER THE TELFAIRE CASE JURY
INSTRUCTION, IS TOO STRONG AND IS
BIASED AGAINST THE STATE.
Appellant's proposed instruction in this case is
lengthy and complex.

In fact, other courts have held that

such an instruction, modeled after the instruction in the
Telfaire case, is too lengthy and complicated to give to a
jury.

For example, in State v. Abernathy, 31 Wash. App. 635,

644 P.2d 691 (1982), it was stated that:
We conclude the court properly ref used
the complex witness identification
instruction based on U.S. v. Telfaire.
Id. at 693
This point was made again by the Washington Court of
Appeals in State v. Jordan, 17 Wash. App. 542, 564 P.2d 340
(1977):
We believe that the instruction-is
impermissibly slanted to the degree that
it should not be given in Washington.
Witness credibility is more properly
tested by examination and cross-examinat ion in the forum of the trial court.
Closing argument affords counsel the
appropriate means to point any weaknesses
in eyewitness identification.
Id. at 341
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CONCLUSION
The appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery
following a jury trial in the Third Judicial District.

He

fully exercised his right to cross-examine the eyewitness and
the other key witnesses in the case.
was rigorous and thorough.

The cross-examination

In his final argument to the jury,

appellant's counsel focused on the dangers of eyewitness
testimony.

Finally, instructions were given to the jury which

urged the members of that panel to consider the weight to be
given to the various witnesses and their testimony.

This

instruction, while not so detailed as the appellant's proposed
instruction, adequately raised the issue of inaccurate
eyewitness identification, particularly when considered in
connection with another jury instruction.
The identification of the appellant by the State's
key eyewitness was credible because of (1) his selection of
the appellant from six photographs of different individuals;
(2) his observation of appellant in broad daylight, first when
he gave appellant change and later when he was robbed; (3) his
detailed description of the crime and the location of the two
perpetrators during its occurrence; and (4) his identification
of the appellant's photo, which occurred less than two weeks
after the crime •
•

This Court has not held that it is error to refuse a
"Telfaire type" instruction of jury identification and it
should not do so in this case.

When the cross-examination,
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final argument, and the actual jury instructions are
c_onsidered together, respondent asserts that the the issue of
mistaken identification was adequately and poperly presented
to the jury.
The conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
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